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Abstract—With the popularity of Blockchain comes grave security related concerns. Achieving privacy and traceability simultaneously
remains an open question. Efforts have been made to address the issues, while they may subject to specific scenarios. This paper
studies how to provide a more general solution for this open question. Concretely, we propose Onionchain, featuring a suite of
protocols, offering both traceability and privacy. As the term implies, our Onionchain is inspired by Onion routing. We investigate the
principles of Onion routing carefully and integrate its mechanism together with Blockchain technology. We advocate the Blockchain
community to adopt Onionchain with the regards of privacy and traceability. To this end, a case-study of Onionchain, which runs in the
context of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), is proposed, providing the community a guideline to follow. Systematic security
analysis and extensive experiments are also conducted to validate our secure and cost-effective Onionchain.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Traceability, Privacy, Vehicles Communication System, Onion Routing.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
O VER the past few years, Blockchain has drawnsignificant attention from both academy and industry
[1]. Blockchain is a novel paradigm where distrustful
parties make transactions and manage data without
involving a trustworthy third-party. Here transactions
refer to interactions occurred between these parties.
Blockchain achieves tamper-resistance and traceability for
the transactions, offering anonymity and decentralization
for the parties. Due to these advanced features, Blockchain
can be applied into a wide spectrum of applications, ranging
from cryptocurrency, financial services, crowd-sourcing
systems [2], [3], and Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
[4], [5]. According to a report from Meticulous Research,
the global Blockchain market will hit $28 billion by 2025 [6].
However, along with its popularity, Blockchain has come
an increasing number of attacks, severely undermining the
victim’s security and privacy. In regards to privacy, although
Blockchain can provide anonymity innately, it subjects to
various cyber-attacks. For example, Fergal et al. [7] show
that an attacker may disclosure the real identity of a given
victim by analyzing his public transaction history. Efforts
have been made to counter these attacks. An example that
addresses the privacy concern is HAWK proposed by Kosba
et al., storing the encrypted transactions instead of plain-
text ones so that the transactional privacy is guaranteed [8].
The term privacy in our paper refers to data privacy unless
explicitly stated otherwise. In data privacy schemes, the
identities of parties are public. However, given a message,
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no efficient adversary can determine if the message is from
a specific party.
While achieving privacy, these solutions may fail to pro-
vide traceability, hindering them to adapt to some scenarios.
For example, in crowd-sourcing systems (or crowd-sensing
system in VANETs [9]), employers may release tasks for
employees, while employees choose the tasks of interest and
get paid when they offer proper solutions. During the life-
cycle of a task, Blockchain endorses the behaviors of both
employers and employees, so that employers/employees
can be held accountable when malicious behaviors occur.
Offering the privacy blindly in such a scenario will lead a
malicious employers/employees to evade responsibilities.
The fact that Blockchain fails to provide traceability
and privacy simultaneously impedes the progress of its
deployment. To address the issue, there are a few existing
works. For example, the primitive, linkable group/ring sig-
natures [10], [11], are possible solutions for this issue. In
these manners, a signature can be generated anonymously
to present the willing of the parties in this group, and
the group manager can reveal the identity/identities that
perform the signature generation. However, the drawback
is also obvious, since the group manager can be malicious,
leading the abuse of the identity disclosure. Lu et al. pro-
pose ZebraLancer [12], where a new primitive common-
prefix-linkable is presented to realize a trade-off between
traceability and anonymity. In the context of crowdsourcing,
a malicious employee can submit his effort twice, to gain
a doubled reward. ZebraLancer is capable of identifying
the double-submission problem and tracing the dishon-
est party. However, ZebraLancer is not omnipotent, since
it fails to discuss how to deploy their protocol in other
scenarios where there is no such malicious behavior like
double-submission. Liu et al. [13] achieve the traceability
and privacy simultaneously by introducing an identity man-
agement entity (IDM) and let IDM recover the identity
of the misbehaving party. While the problem solved, their
design partly violates the discretization of Blockchain. Other
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
03
36
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Se
p 2
01
9
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2019 2
solutions, such as [14], may also subject to specific scenarios.
Therefore, balancing the traceability and privacy simultane-
ously remains an open question.
This paper tries to provide a general solution for this
issue. To this end, we propose Onionchain, offering trace-
ability and privacy at the same time. The intuition behind
our research is that we observed that Onion routing can
achieve traceability and privacy in different contexts. Onion
routing [15] is an infrastructure designed for anonymous
communication. It uses a set of onion routers instead of
using regular routers. The onion routers encrypt and relay
packets between a source node and a destination node.
In terms of privacy, onion routers resistant to both eaves-
dropping and traffic analysis innately, since the encryption
process is present. In terms of traceability, Onion routing is
a communication mechanism featuring routing and packets
transmitting. In the view of the onion routers, they can
identify an intended source and an intended destination
by decrypting the encrypted packets accordingly. But, for
a single onion router, it has limited routing information and
provides packets forwarding partly. Therefore, for most of
the time, as a destination or an onion router, they cannot
trace the packets back to the source. This is because tracing
a packet needs the efforts of all relaying onion routers, but
the onion routers will not work cooperatively to make this
happen since they are different nodes in the network. [15]
Inspired by these two features, we systematically investigate
the underlying principles of the Onion routing and design
Onionchain.
The high-level idea is that we introduce Blockchain as
a trustworthy party, and enable the onion router-like nodes
to decrypt the packets to Blockchain conditionally. That is,
Blockchain will perform the identity disclosure according
to the willing of majority. In such a way, Onionchain
achieves traceability and privacy simultaneously: Normally,
Onionchain will offer privacy for each party. In the special
case where disclosure is needed, parties will work closely
to make the disclosure happen. To notice, our Onionchain
integrate the mechanism of Onion routing together with
Blockchain technology instead of using Onion routing as a
building block directly. Using Onion routing with no change
is fairly trivial. More importantly, while achieving privacy,
Using onion routing barely fails to provide a proper solution
for nodes to work jointly to disclose a specific identity [16].
We advocate the community to adopt Onionchain
when Blockchain applications require achieving both
of traceability and privacy. As a case study, we deploy
our Onionchain in the case of VANETs. In such a context,
vehicles by sharing the information of the road environment
work jointly to prevent traffic jams and accidents. Therefore,
it is crucial for vehicles to obtain information without
any errors in a timely manner. Blockchain provides a
decentralized data sharing environment for VANETs, as
shown in prior efforts [17], [18], [19], offering privacy-
preserving for vehicles. However, a malicious vehicle may
poke the pitfalls of VANETs in various ways, spreading false
information intentionally, misleading other vehicles. One
example is Blockhole attack [20], where a malicious vehicle
pretends to be another benign vehicle, and discard any
packets that flow toward it, causing severe packet loss. In
such a context, providing privacy without traceability, such
as what the traditional Blockchain-based solutions have
done, is not enough. As a countermeasure, we introduce our
Onionchain to guide behaviors of vehicles. Our Onionchain
can provide the privacy-preserving for a benign vehicle,
and identify the malicious vehicle when an attack occurs.
Major contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We design Onionchain, featuring a suite of customized
protocols and algorithms, achieving traceability and
privacy simultaneously.
2) We demonstrate our Onionchain in the context of ve-
hicles communication systems, avoiding vehicles to
spread false information or discard valuable informa-
tion intentionally. For the sake of generality, the demon-
stration in our paper can be trivially extended to other
similar scenarios.
3) We validate our Onionchain and the proposed coun-
termeasure for VANETs. We prototype the counter-
measure on Ethereum. Excessive experiments are per-
formed to evaluate our implementation, showing the
overload is fairly acceptable.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we introduce primitives involved in our paper, including
Blockchain, smart contracts, Onion routing, and VANETs. In
Section 3, we present the security model of Onionchain. In
Section 4, we elaborate on the design criteria of Onionchain
and deploy it in the context of the vehicles communication
system. We systematically analyze the security of Onion-
chain in Section 5 and evaluate Onionchain experimentally
in Section 6. Related works are reviewed in Section 7. We
conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first provide a brief introduction
of Blockchain and smart contracts technology. Afterward,
we elaborate an overview of onion routing to demonstrate
the principles behind. We also show the architecture of
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs).
2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain was first proposed by Nakamoto in [21],
as the fundamental primitive of decentralized digital cur-
rency, Bitcoin. In the context of Bitcoin, Blockchain is a
distributed public ledger, which is initially designed for
mutually distrustful parties to make transactions without
involving a trustworthy center. To achieve this, each party
needs to maintain the entire copy of Blockchain and works
cooperatively to record the transactions. The transactions
are organized as a data block, which is composed of a
block header and a block body. Basically, the transactions
are stored in the block body, while the block header contains
a root hash and a reference. The root hash is the hash of a
Merkle Tree [22] of all transactions in the block body. The
reference, which is also a hash value, is computed from the
block header of the previous block.
Each party has an identity, termed address, which
uniquely refers to a specific party. To obtain an identity,
each party needs to generate a pair of public/private key.
The private key is used for signature verification, and the
public key is used for signature generation and builds the
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address. To notice, not all parties can record transactions on
Blockchain. The one who has the priority to append data,
termed miner, needs to provide a solution to a certain puz-
zle, known as proof-of-work ((PoW) [23] or proof-of-stake
(PoS) [24] etc. For example, the PoW is a hash computing
puzzle that can only be solved when an appropriate answer
is fed into the hash function. Due to the property of the hash
function, the puzzle requires much efforts to find out such
an answer, while the validity of the answer can be trivially
checked.
Blockchain records all transactions by default, and it
achieves tamper-resistance and traceability innately. The
main reasons are: (i) For a single block, each block maintains
the hash of a Merkle Tree that computed from transactions
in the block body, so that no more modifications can be
made once the block is generated, since changes will make
the hash root of Merkle Tree fail to match the original one;
(ii) For the entire Blockchain, Blockchain is maintained by
each party, so that it is impossible for a single party to
modify it, since modifying the Blockchain of himself will
not make any influences to other parties. Moreover, due to
the reference to the previous block, the integrity of the entire
Blockchain is also guaranteed, since each party can verify it
chronologically without any changes; (iii) The only way to
make a modification happen, i.e., adding a new transaction
to Blockchain, may require a lot of efforts since the one who
wants to do so must solve the puzzle first.
2.2 Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are digital agreements that are made
between different parties. The term was first introduced in
1994 by Nick Szabo [25], and gained many attentions with
the booming of Blockchain. In smart contracts, instead of
using the printed contracts, and enforcing to execute via a
suite of regulations or laws, smart contracts are grouped into
lines of codes, and will be executed when specific conditions
are fulfilled. To ensure the proper execution of the codes, a
secure environment must be guaranteed. Otherwise, an at-
tacker may compromise the codes to maximize his benefits.
This was a giant barrier that hinders the development of
smart contracts. However, as mentioned earlier, Blockchain
contributes a lot to the popularity of smart contracts, since
decentralized Blockchain networks and other advanced fea-
tures of Blockchain can offer such a secure environment
for smart contracts. Examples of Blockchain that run smart
contracts include Ethereum [26] and Hyperledger [27].
2.3 Onion Routing
Onion Routing [15] is an infrastructure for anonymous
communication. Instead of creating socket connections be-
tween the two communicating machines directly, onion
routing achieves the communication via a sequence of ma-
chines termed onion routers. Onion routers relay the two
communicating machines, offering routing and address-
ing, allowing the two communicating machines to remain
anonymous in one way or both ways. One application of
onion routing is anonymous web browsing. In this case, a
user may want to browse a website without disclosing his
identity to the webserver. That is, anything related to him,
Tor NetworkUser Web Server
Request
Encrypted link
Encryption
Plain-text link
A
B
C
onion
Fig. 1. The principle of onion routing
such as IP address or MAC address, shall be removed from
the browsing request.
To demonstrate the principle of onion routing, Fig. 1
illustrates the process of anonymous web browsing. Specif-
ically, when the user wants to browse a website anony-
mously, he must follow the steps elaborated below:
1) Initially, the user uses an onion proxy to randomly
choose three onion routers (A,B,C in the figure) in
the network and negotiate three different keys with the
three onion routers. We denote the encryption keys as
KeyUser−A, KeyA−B , KeyB−C , where the first letter
in subscript refers to the sender of the packet, while
the second letter refers to the responder of the packet.
To notice, we are aware that the public cryptography
and other technologies/roles are also involved in this
process, and we will not discuss the key negotiation in
detail for the sake of brevity.
2) To achieve anonymous communication, the user en-
crypts the browsing request with the encryption keys
successively. The user also hard-code the next-hop in-
formation inside the encrypted browsing request, to
make sure that each onion router is aware of its next
hop. The encrypted browsing request is called the
onion.
3) The user sends the onion to the first onion router A. The
first onion router removes the first layer encryption by
decrypting the onion with the key KeyUser−A, which
is negotiated previously. Once decrypted, the onion
router then knows which onion router is the one it
should send the onion to. In our context, the first onion
router will send the onion to B.
4) B receives the onion and removes the second layer
encryption by decrypting the onion with the key
KeyA−B , so that it obtains its next-hop information.
The second onion router then sends the onion to C .
5) C removes the last layer of the onion by decrypting the
onion with the key KeyB−C , and sends the browsing
request, which is in plain-text, to the intended web
server. The three onion routers then communicate with
each other and work jointly to relay the packets be-
tween the user and the webserver.
Since the links between each other are encrypted, each
router may only obtain limited information about the con-
nection. For example, for the onion router A, it only knows
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Fig. 1: The workflow of V2V system
hand, the structure and processes of a V2V system and
traditional networks have many similarities. Figure.1 shows
the major activities in V2V system work-flow. Compared
with the traditional WLAN and the wired network, V2V
systems use the Road-Side Unit(RSU) to replace the AP.
The RSU provides similar functionality as AP, which is used
to connect to the internet. These RSUs have been installed
along both sides of the road, and each RSU covers a region
that is for the use of the network access of vehicles. The
region is called the WAVE Basic Service Set. Another im-
portant component is the On-Board Unit(OBU). OBU is the
alternative to STA, which have been mounted in vehicles.
Commonly, vehicles connect to the RSUs via their OBUs.
When there is no RSU available, they could communicate to
each other by using OBUs. In other words, vehicles could
transmit information in a real-time way between OBU and
RSU, or between two OBUs.
As a pure Blockchain-based V2V system, we do not want
to use these RSUs in our design, since these infrastructures
are conflicting with the Blockchain’s decentralization. We
use the OBUs only, which makes the RSUs without being
at all aware of our systems. The advantage of this is that
nodes in our system are equally-positioned and parallel-
developing, which can effectively avoid that one node has
oversize privilege. Meanwhile, it is also a good way to avoid
the single point of failure.
3.2 Blockchain Technology
Blockchain was initially proposed by Nakamoto in bit-
coin which is a decentralized digital currency [6]. Having
seen the success of bitcoin, more and more people start
paying attention to Blockchain. The blockchain is a dis-
tributed open database, which is self-maintained by each
node in the network. Each node has one or more addresses,
which is regarded as account numbers they interact with.
The interactions among nodes are organized into data struc-
ture named transaction, and the transactions are grouped
into data blocks. By adding all these blocks together, and
letting each block refers to its previous one, a Blockchain is
generated. All these blocks are protected with cryptographic
techniques which ensure the impossibility to tamper with
any individual transaction. On another hand, since each
node maintained the full copy of Blockchain, each node
could verify the validation of transactions without external
assistance.
Unfortunately, the decentralization of Blockchain also
brings some challenges. Since there is no third party in
Blockchain, each node has to maintain the complete copy of
the whole blockchain, which increases the storage costs. A
full node needs to dedicate more than 100G hard disk space
to synchronize with the network, which is impossible to run
on space- and power-constrained devices. To address this
problem, the simplified payment verification (SPV) method
is proposed to allow a mobile device to operate without
storing the full Blockchain.
The SPV method was proposed by letting some nodes
only to hold the headers of blocks. The header is the unique
identity of a block, which is calculated by Hash functions
[15]. When a node wants to verify the validation of a
transaction, it only verifies the validation of chain of blocks
by checking the existence of headers, instead of verifying all
transactions. In another word, when examining a transac-
tion, the SPV node will establish a link between the transac-
tion and the block that contains it. Then, the SPV node will
verify the six blocks piled on top of this block by checking if
their headers are in the chain of headers which is maintained
by the SPV node[16]. To verify a specific transaction, SPV
nodes need to retrieve transactions selectively, which creates
a privacy risk. For example, too many requests from one
node could reveal the identity of a user [17]. Thus, the SPV
introduced the Bloomfilter [18] to avoid such a problem.
The Bloom filter allows SPV nodes to receive transactions
without precisely revealing the addresses they are interested
in, which puzzles the attacker’s attention effectively.
Our scheme also uses the SPV method as a building
block. Thus, our scheme is effective in transaction verifi-
cation and privacy preserving.
4 OVERVIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS
4.1 Overview
Our mechanism follows a simple idea: let subsets of
nodes hold a few blocks, as well as all headers of blocks,
instead of maintaining the whole Blockchain, which re-
duces the storage consumption effectively. Under the cir-
cumstances, when a node wants to verify a transaction, it
only needs to find out the block containing this transaction,
and use the SPV method to complete the verification. Blocks
in each node can be lined up together to recover the whole
Blockchain. The process of transaction verification looks like
playing a jigsaw puzzle, that is why we call it puzzle-chain.
The overview of our puzzle-chain is given in Figure.2.
In our puzzle-chain, just like every other Blockchain,
blocks are generated by solving puzzles of controlled hard-
ness (such as POW or POS). The difference between our
protocol and others is the incentive mechanism. For ex-
ample, when someone works out the puzzle and gets a
new block, he will get very few reward, which is altered
from traditional Blockchains. The great majority of incomes
come from the service charge, which means that nodes
collect fees for providing blocks that required by others.
Because of this, our system is self-adjusted in maintaining
the population of blocks, which strengthens the stability and
the security. Meanwhile, to protect the privacy of providers,
we introduce the block mix protocol to thwart attackers.
Fig. 2. Overview of vehicl s communication system
who is t e ender of the packet and who is its next hop.
For the onion router C , it only knows the information about
t e webserver and its previous hop. F r the onion router
B, it neither knows the information about the user nor
the information about the webserver. The nly information
he obtained is the hop information. In such a way, onion
r uting a hieves anonymous communication.
2.4 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) [28], [29], [30], as
the term itself implies, is designed for vehicles to achieve
communication. It has aroused researchers interest since
it offers a paradigm for facilitating smart city. In vehicles
communication systems, vehicles are equipped with a set of
sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) [31], and Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags [32], which allows
them to sense the environment around. Examples of the
applications of vehicles communication systems include
navigation, path planning. For instance, in the case of path
planning, vehicles may communicate with each other to
share the traffic information, so that a suitable route can
be selected, avoiding the traffic jams [33].
Fig. 2 shows an overview of the vehicles communi-
cation system. Instead of using traditional Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) and the wired network, vehicles
communication system introduce Road-Side Units (RSUs)
to connect the internet. These RSUs are installed along
the road-sides, providing Internet access for vehicles. The
coverage of each RSU is termed Wir less Advanced Vehicle
Electrification (WAVE) B sic Service Set. Basi ally, vehicles
con ect to the RSUs via their On-Board Units (OBU), which
is a component mounted inside each vehicle. When there is
no RSU available, the vehicles can also achieve local area
communication.
3 SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we first present the security goals of
Onionchain. We will also make the basic assumptions for
our design afterwards.
3.1 Security Goals
We cl m the ultimate goals of Onion hain. It can be ob-
served from the intro uction and the pr nciple of Blockchain
that he current design of Blockchain applications fails to
achieve privacy and traceability simultaneously. Therefore,
Onionchain has the following essential design requirements:
Privacy: First of all, the privacy issue is our main
concern. The term privacy refers to data privacy, where
identities of parties are public, while there is no efficient
adversary can determine if a given message is sent from a
specific party. That is, as long as a party behave honestly,
no body can link the message he sent to his public identity.
The identity may include IP address, Mac address, or other
personal information. Onionchain will provide a counter-
measure for these parties, against their privacy being leaked.
Traceability: Second, with regard to traceability, Onion-
chain will disclose a specific identity of a party following the
willing of the majority. That is, when a dishonest/malicious
behavior occurs, the majority of parties may require the
Onionchain to reveal the identity of a party, and Onionchain
will fulfill the requirement.
3.2 Assumptions
In our system, an attacker’s goal is to reveal the identities
of parties and pokes the design flaws of our Onionchain.
Without loss of generality, we make the following assump-
tions for attackers and our system.
1) In our design, cryptographic mechanisms will be in-
volved, and we assume these cryptographic mecha-
nisms are not a source of vulnerability. For example,
an attacker cannot break the AES encryption or forge a
digital signature.
2) We assume that the fundamental assumption of Onion
routers still holds. That is, the nodes in the network are
randomly distrusted. Therefore, when a party chooses
nodes from network randomly, the chosen nodes are
not all manipulated by an attacker.
3) We assume that an attacker can access all the trans-
action history without any change. This is reasonable
since Blockchain is a public ledger that is free to
download for anyone. This assumption offers the worst
scenario for our design. Our design can hinder the
privacy leakage in this scenario, and it also hinders
other scenarios.
4) We assume that a large number of parties are involved
in our system. This is reasonable since systems, such
as vehicles communication systems, may involve hun-
dreds of participants.
5) A malicious party may spread false message inten-
tionally, misleading other parties in various ways. We
assume that after after a message being spread, other
parties have ways to identify whether the information
is a false one. For example, false information can be
fake traffic information on a specific r ad, which can
be trivially identified when a vehicle arrivals there.
However, more ways of identifying false information
are out of our focus, and we will not discuss it.
4 ONIONCHAIN
W fi st explain our insights behind our design. From
the introduction of nion routing in Section 2.3, we learn
that onion rout ng resi ts o both avesdropping and tr ffic
analysis innately. We al o observe tha the onion routers
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will relay the packets between an intended source and an
intended destination. For most of the time, as a destination,
it cannot trace the packets back to the source. This is because
that the destination and its previous hop, which is an onion
router, are different nodes in the network. They shall not
share the hop or routing information with each other. But
what if the destination node and the three onion routers
are all manipulated by a third-party behind? In this case,
the third-party can obtain all the routing information, and
trace from a destination back to a source. That is, he is
capable of disclosing the identity of the source. Here, such a
third party can be a good or evil, depending on if and how
he will perform the disclosure. If he is ultimately fair and
only behaves according to the willing of majority, he is a
good one. However, does such a flawless third party exist?
Actually, Blockchain can be such a third party. Motivated
by this, we have designed a suite of protocols, termed
Onionchain which make Blockchain to be such a third party.
In the following of this section, we will present the criteria
of our design in detail.
4.1 Overview
Onionchain offers three core protocols for parties to
achieve privacy-preserving and tracing transactions, includ-
ing the registration, message transmitting, and identity dis-
closure. Registration is used for parties to join Onionchain.
To this end, each party must provide their real identity to
Onionchain distributedly, and Onionchain will store these
information onto Blockchain. All these information are free
to access for the public. In regard of privacy-preserving,
although the information is publicly accessible, an attacker
cannot link a specific message to its sender according to
our design. The privacy of each party is still preserved.
Message transmitting is a protocol that defines how two
parties transmit a message via the network. Different from
the traditional network communication, the message sender
and the message responder may need to write data onto
Blockchain. The data, termed evidence in our case, is en-
crypted by negotiated keys, and also plays an important role
in the identity disclosure protocol. The disclosure protocol
will perform when the parties have the requirement to
disclose a specific sender. Say, when false information is
identified, the parties want to know who is the sender of
this false information. In this case, our identity disclosure
protocol can link the false information to a specific sender
by decrypting the evidence.
4.2 Design Criteria
In this section, we will elaborate on the design criteria
of registration protocol, message transmitting protocol, and
identity disclosure protocol. For ease of description, we
summarize the basic operations in Table 1.
Registration protocol: This protocol is used for parties to
sign up in our system. It works as follows: (i) When a party
A wants to join the system, he first creates a public/private
key pair, denoted as SKA, PubKA, which can be used
to perform signature generation and verification. (ii) He
uses his private key SKA to sign his real identity ID, and
put his public key PubKA and the generated signature S
together to generate a registration request, i.e regReq =
TABLE 1
Summary of notations
Notation Description
a→ b a routing message, where a is
the source and b is the
destination
PubKi the public key of a party i
SKi the private key of a party i
s1||s2 a combination of a string s1
and a string s2
ENC(key,msg) The AES encryption process,
where key refers to a
encryption key, and msg refers
to a message
DEC(key,ctext) The decryption process, where
key refers to a encryption key,
and ctext refers to a cipher-text
SIGN(SK,msg) The signature generation
process, where SK refers to a
private key, and msg refers to a
message
VERIFY(PubK,sig,m) The signature generation
process, where PubK refers to
a private key, and sig refers to
a signature, while m is the
message
(PubKA||S). The ID here uniquely refers to a specific party.
He submits the registration request to the Blockchain P2P
network and preserves his private key carefully. To notice,
before the request having been approved and written onto
Blockchain, A is not permitted to send any other request.
(iii) Other parties will verify the registration request before
they write it onto Blockchain. The verification process is
to make sure the signature is generated from the attached
public key PubKA, and the one who sends the request
has the same identity as attached. Otherwise, other parties
will reject the request. The other parties also need to check
if the public key attached has been used by other parties
else. Since the request can be viewed by all the parties, it
is trivial for them to identify a duplicate public key. That
is, each party compares the attached public key with his
own public key and confirms that they are not the same.
If they are the same, the party with the same public key
will broadcast a confliction. The confliction is also a type of
request that has a higher priority for other parties to process.
Also, other parties may need to check if the identity used is
a valid one or fabricated by the party itself. Therefore, the
Blockchain used in our paper is a permissioned blockchain.
The permissioned blockchain is a type of Blockchain that
requires permission to join, and limits the parties who can
provide the solution for the puzzle, i.e., being the miners.
Recall that all parties other than miners can submit their
transactions into Blockchain network, but only miners have
the permission to record the transactions. This is reasonable
because it reduces the risk of being attacked by some attacks,
e.g., 51% attack and selfish mining attack. The process of
how to group the requests as transitions, and how to write
the transactions are as same as Bitcoin, and we will not go
to details due to the page limitation.
Message transmitting: This protocol is the core engine of
our design. As shown in Fig. 3, we use three hops as relays
between a transmitter T and a receiver R to demonstrate
our principle. Using three hops as relays are the minimum
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requirement of our system. However, parties can choose
more than three hops to achieve better privacy. Specifically,
we elaborate on the steps below:
1) Initially, the sender who wants to send the message
first randomly chooses three nodes in the Blockchain
P2P network. The three nodes are denoted as A,B,C
respectively. The sender also negotiates the three
different keys with the three nodes. The key negotiation
process is as same as that in onion routing, so we will
not repeat it due to the page limitation. We denote
the encryption keys as KT−A, KA−B , KB−C , where
the first letter in subscript refers to the sender of the
packet, while the second letter refers to the packets
responder. For example, KT−A is used to encrypt a
message that sent from T to A.
2) T encrypts the message with the three encryption key
successively. The user also hard-code the next-hop in-
formation, e.g., A→ B , inside the encrypted message,
to make sure that each node is aware of its next-hop
respectively. As mentioned earlier, the encrypted
message is called evidence in our paper. To notice,
during the message transmitting, there is more than
one evidence are generated. We denote this evidence
EV0. We also denote the message as m, which contains
a timestamp to grantee the freshness of messages.
Formally, EV0 can be represented as equation (1) :
EV0 = ENC(KT−A, (A→ B ||ENC(KA−B ,
(B → C ||ENC(KB−C , (C → R ||m)))))) (1)
3) A first removes the first layer encryption by decrypting
the EV0 with the key KT−A, which is negotiated early.
We denote the decrypted onion-like packets as V0.
Formally,V0 can be represented as equation (2) :
V0 = ENC(KA−B , (B → C || ENC(KB−C ,
(C → R ||m)))) (2)
Once decrypted, A then knows which node is the
next hop. In our context, A will send V0 packet to
B, and the key used between A and B is KA−B .
Before this process, A also needs to generate a new
evidence and submit it to Blockchain first. Here, A
and T are required to work closely, and generate a
the new evidence EV1. To this end, T signs EV0 with
his private key, and sends EV0|SIGN(SKT , EV0) to
the first node A. The first node verifies the signature
using the public key of T . Recall the public key was
written onto Blockchain in the registration process and
free to index. This step is used to ensure the message
is sent from T , not other parties. Once the verification
processed, A signs SIGN(SKT , EV0) with his own
private key SKA. Thereafter, the two parties negotiate
a new key PKT−A, termed proof key, then encrypts
SIGN(SKA, SIGN(SKT , EV0)) with PKT−A to
generate the new evidence EV1. This step ensures
that A receives the message successfully. The EV1 are
suppose to be written on Blockchain. Here, T and A
have the same proof key PKT−A, so that they can
check the signatures and confirms that they all follow
the protocol properly, while other parities will have
no information about EV1. To notice, the KT−A and
Blockchain
Transmitter
Receiver
A B C
V0 V1
Sign Sign Sign
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4
Sign
Fig. 3. Overview of message transmitting protocol
PKT−A can not be the same, and each party is required
to keep the PK carefully for the further usage. Also,
every time when a new message is sent, each party
needs to negotiate a new proof key. Formally, EV1 can
be represented as equation (3):
EV1 = ENC( PKT−A,SIGN( SKA,
(SIGN( SKT , EV0)))))
(3)
4) A will wait until EV1 is written onto Blockchain.
Thereafter, A will send V0 packet to B. B then removes
the second layer encryption with the key KA−B and
generate the onion-like packets as V1. Formally, V1 can
be represented as equation (4):
V1 = ENC(KB−C , (C → R ||m)) (4)
Afterwards, A and B work closely to generate a new
evidence EV2. The process is similar to what we have
elaborated in previous step, and we will not repeat it.
Specifically, EV2 can be represented as equation (5):
EV2 = ENC(PKA−B , SIGN( SKB ,
SIGN(SKA, V0||EV1))) (5)
5) B will wait until EV2 is written onto Blockchain.
Thereafter, B will send V1 to C . C then removes the
finally layer encryption with the key KB−C and obtains
the message m in plain-text. At this time, B and C work
closely to generate a new evidence EV3. Specifically,
EV3 can be represented as shown in equation (6):
EV3 = ENC( PKB−C , SIGN(SKC ,
SIGN(SKB , V1||EV2))) (6)
6) C will wait until EV3 is written onto Blockchain.
Afterwards, C will send message to R. R and C
then work closely to generate a new evidence EV4.
Specifically, EV4 can be represented as equaltion (7):
EV4 = ENC( PKC−R, SIGN(SKR,
SIGN(SKC ,m||EV3))) (7)
Identity disclosure:
Identity disclosure is available when a dishonest behav-
ior has been detected. As shown in algorithm. 1, we elabo-
rate the entire process of Identity disclosure. Basically, it is
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the reverse process of message transmitting. To perform an
identity disclosure, the parties that involved in the message
transmitting may need to decrypt the evidence using the
proof key. We termed the decryption process of each party
as “plea of innocence” since each party uses this process
to prove that he is innocent. Suppose that a receiver R
identifies a message m being a false message and wants to
find the transmitter T . Once the identity disclosure request
has been approved by the majority, the identity disclosure
process will be launched. Recall that we assume that parties
have the abilities to identify false information. A request
can be approved only when most parties has identified the
information is a false one. As shown in Fig. 4, we use the
former example to elaborate on the identity disclose process
below:
Algorithm 1: Identity disclosure protocol
Data: mfake, EVi
Output: Rx
j = i− 1;
Vj = mfake;
for j >0 do
Relaying node Rj−1 release his proof key
PKRj−1 :
if PKRj−1 == ∅ then
Rx = Rj−1;
RETURN Rx;
end
else
DEC(PKj−1, EVj)
= SIGN(SKRj−2 , SIGN(SKRj−1EVj−1||Vj);
= Sj
if VERIFY(PubKj−1, Sj , (Vj ||EVj−1))) then
if VERIFY(PubKj−2, Sj , (Vj ||EVj−1)))
then
j=j-1;
end
else
Rx = Rj−2;
RETURN Rx;
end
end
else
Rx = Rj−1;
RETURN Rx;
end
end
end
Rx = Rj ;
RETURN Rx;
1) The receiver R requires a party C to perform the plea
of innocence since R receives the false message from C .
To prove so, R locates evidence EV4 on Blockchain, and
makes the location of EV4 and the PKC−R publicly
accessible. In this way, all parties in the Blockchain P2P
network can perform the decryption process, as show
in equation (8).
DEC( PKC−R, EV4) = SIGN(SKR,
SIGN(SKC ,m||EV3)) = S4 (8)
Transmitter A B C Receiver
Blockchain
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4
Proof Key C-RProof Key B-CProof Key A-BProof Key T-A
Fig. 4. Overview of identity disclosure protocol
After the decryption process, all parties know that the
previous hop is C , which was confirmed by C and R,
since their signature are present. As shown in equation
9, all parties can perform their signature verification
without any changes1.
VERIFY(PubKC , S4, (m||EV3))) (9)
2) In this case, C is required to perform the plea of
innocence. Different from the first step, the evidence
EV3 is contained in the plain-text of EV4. So C is only
required to make the PKB−C publicly accessible. In
such a way, parties know that previous hop is B, which
was confirmed by B and C , since their signature are
present. Meanwhile, new evidence EV2 shows up.
3) Thereafter, B is required to perform the plea of inno-
cence. Similar to the previous process, B finally reveals
a piece of new evidence EV1.
4) Afterwards, A is required to perform the plea of inno-
cence. The process is also similar to the previous one.
Finally, a a piece of new evidence EV0 shows up.
5) Finally, T is required to perform the plea of innocence.
A is required to make a proof key publicly accessible.
However, T does not have a proof key for EV0, since
T is the message transmitter. Therefore, T is accused of
false message spreading. In this case, T can also release
the three keys, which is considered as a “confession”.
4.3 Onionchain Based Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
We then introduce the work-flow of our Onionchain-
based Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (OVANETs), avoiding
vehicles to spread false information intentionally. The moti-
vation of this section is to demonstrate the generality of our
Onionchain.
From a high level, OVANETs is built on a Blockchain-
based reputation system [34], [35]. In such a reputation
system, vehicles share useful information, such as traffic
information or information about road conditions, to gain
their reputations. They are self-motivated by a suite of
incentive mechanism. For example, vehicles with higher
reputation may have more priority to access resources, or
1. The verification process is similar to that of R, and we will not
repeat it.
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they can use reputations to earn their gas, while a vehicle
with a lower reputation may fail to access some services.
Therefore, each vehicle values its reputation and tries to
have a higher reputation by behaving honestly and offering
good service for other vehicles. Basically, a Blockchain-based
database provides endorsements for our system. The en-
dorsements are tamper-proof due to the advanced features
of Blockchain.
In such a scenario, privacy-preserving is an indispens-
able requirement [36]. Vehicles may require to remain
anonymous for various reasons. For example, vehicles may
be easy to be convinced by a message from a vehicle with
higher reputation, while they may fail to believe information
from a vehicle with a low reputation. In this case, the
vehicles with a low reputation, like a vehicle which has
just joined the system, may never have a chance to earn
its reputation. Therefore, Onionchain offers opportunities
for vehicles with lower reputations due to our privacy-
preserving. On the other hand, Onionchain can also work
inversely and identifies these vehicles spreading false infor-
mation. Once identified, punishments are enforced for these
dishonest vehicles. One punishment can be decreasing their
reputations. Finally, considering the limited storage resource
of vehicles, the designer can choose RSUs to deploy the
Onionchain, while vehicles can communicate with RSUs via
VANET.
It can be observed that our Onionchain can be extended
to other similar scenarios with a little hindrance. For ex-
ample, in the context of crowd-sourcing systems, employ-
ers/employees can also set up such an Onionchain based
system to achieve privacy and traceability simultaneously.
They may also use the idea of a reputation system to evalu-
ate an employer/employee, and penalize the malicious par-
ties when un-honest behaviors are detected. Moreover, by
using the smart contracts introduced in section 2.2, the entire
process may be executed automatically without the human’s
involvement, reducing the burdens of management.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will give the security analysis of
our Onionchain. Specifically, an attacker may intentionally
create a craft-packets and try to deploy attacks on our
Onionchain in various ways. Notably, we examine the
transmitter, relaying nodes, receiver throughout the life-
cycle of a transaction and conduct five attack vectors in the
regards of security analysis, as shown in Table 2. It can
be observed that our Onionchain can hinder all the attack
vectors without any change.
Malicious-Transmitter Attack: In this type of attack, a
malicious transmitter may create a false message intention-
ally, and uses another message, which is considered benign,
to generate shreds of evidence. We assume that the false
message is mfake, and the benign message is m. His moti-
vation is to evade responsibility when the false message is
detected. However, it is not possible for attackers to achieve
so. In this case, the party A will not allow the transmitter
to do so since the evidence is not the one A received from
the transmitter. Even if A is compromised by T , this type of
attack still fails, since A may require to publish all the keys
eventually, and mfake 6= m.
TABLE 2
Attack Surface(Xrefers to our Onionchain can defend the attack without
any changes)
Attack
Name
Initiator Number of
Attackers
Onionchain
Malicious-
Transmitter
Transmitter Single X
Malicious-
Messenger
Relaying
nodes
Single X
Replay All
participants
Single X
Calumniating Receiver Single X
Collusion All
participants
Multiple X
Malicious-Messenger Attack: In this case, the malicious
party is one of the relaying nodes, e.g. B in our case. B
creates a false message mfake intentionally, and instead of
using the original evidence, which is EV2 in our case, B
crafts new evidence EV ′2 based on a fake message mfake.
He also crafts a fake V ′1 based on the fake message mfake.
To notice, B does not know who will be the receiver, so
he chooses a receiver R′ randomly. His goal is to conceive
others to believe the false message is from the transmitter.
This type of attack will fail quickly. Since when the identity
disclose protocol occurs, the attacker can not link the fake
evidence EV ′2 to its previous evidence EV1. However, if he
only crafts a fake V ′1 based on the fake message mfake, and
uses the original EV2, the attack will still fail. The reason is
similar to the first case, and we will not repeat.
Replay Attack: Replay attack occurs when malicious
relaying nodes resend a previous message and use the same
evidence that used before. However, our timestamp can
provide freshness for each message. The message receiver
will discard the messages when they are stale.
Calumniating Attack: In this type of attack, an malicious
receiver may create a false message/evidence intentionally,
and tries to conceive others to believe the false message is
from the transmitter. We assume that the false message is
mfake, and the original message is m. Therefore, in this case,
EV4 can be represented as follows:
EV4 = ENC( PKC−R, SIGN(SkR,
SIGN(SkC ,mfake||EV3))) (10)
However, the attacker can not modify or replace the evi-
dence EV3. This is because EV4 is generated by C and R
corporately, and C will not put his signature on it, if he
detects EV3 6= EV4. Therefore, as described in the identity
disclosure protocol, EV3 can be traced back to EV0. At this
moment, T will make the three keys, i.e KT−A, KA−B ,
KB−C , publicly accessible, so that all parities can recover
the original message m. It can be observed that mfake 6= m,
which turns out that R tires to perform an Calumniating
Attack.
Collusion Attack: In this case, two parties work jointly,
and tries to craft a fake message. However, this type of
attack is subject to the analysis in the previous examples.
That is, the goal of an attacker is to create fake evidence or a
fake message, and these fake ones fail to equal the previous
evidence when parties perform the identity disclose. There-
fore, our Onionchain can defend this type of attacks with no
changes. Moreover, in our paper, we demonstrate the case
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where there are only three relaying nodes are involved. It
can be much more complicated for the attacker to deploy a
Collusion Attack when more relaying nodes are presented,
which hinders the Collusion Attack effectively.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our presented Onionchain.
We first introduce the simulation environment of our pro-
totype. We then introduce a few metrics to validate the
feasibility and effectiveness of Onionchain.
6.1 Simulation Environment
We simulate Onionchain as a Java Program (version
1.8). The Java Program communicate a local Ethereum En-
vironment via web3j Library and the smart contracts are
programmed by Solidity language. Basically, the Oniochain
client generates a transaction locally, and submits the trans-
action through the Web3j Interface, since Solidity language
has limited support of cryptographic functionality. Also, we
exclude the propagation delay, since it is negligible when
compared with cryptographic operations, and it would be
tricky to run our phototype on multiple machines. In terms
of cryptographic operations, we use AES-128 as our sym-
metric encryption algorithm and ECDSA as our signature
generation/verification algorithm. We also assume that one
party will perform our protocol instantly once he receives a
specific packet. That is, we do not take human intervention
as a consideration. This is reasonable since it is not possible
to measure time cost when human intervention is involved.
Besides, The testing experiments are set up on a desktop
computer with 2.20GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) Processor and
32GB memory.
6.2 Numbers of Relay Nodes
Recall that the security of Onionchain partly depends on
the numbers of relaying nodes. A transmitter may choose to
use multiple relaying nodes to achieve better privacy. Fig 5
shows the relationship between numbers of relaying nodes
and the time cost. We choose different numbers of relay
nodes and run our message transmitting protocol and iden-
tity disclosure protocol, respectively. Here, the message used
to transmit via the network is 128 bit. It can be observed
that all the two protocols cost less than 200,000 us (i.e. 200
ms ), even if there are 30 relaying nodes are involved. Also,
performing message transmitting protocol costs more time
when compared with the other. This is because that message
transmitting protocol uses more cryptographic operations.
For example, message transmitting protocol involves signa-
ture generation while the identity disclosure is not. During
our experiments, we also observe that when we execute one
function twice during a short period of time, the second
execution will be much faster than the first one. This may be
because (i) if two calls are close to each other, the important
information, such as the address of a function, might still be
in the cache, meaning that the CPU does not need to fetch
it again from memory. (ii) The hardware for executing the
function is still active and ready after the first execution.
This discovery will make more sense when we process a
large number of messages in a real environment.
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a function, might still be in the cache, meaning that the CPU
does not need to fetch it again from memory. (ii) The hardware
for executing the function is still active and ready after the
first execution. This discovery will make more sense when we
process a large number of messages in a real environment.
C. Average Time Cost
We conduct experiments to evaluate Onionchain perfor-
mance in regard of average time cost. To this end, we run the
message transmitting protocol and identity disclosure protocol
for 30 times and measure the time cost on average. Each
time we use 3, 5, 10 relaying nodes respectively, to explore
the performance in different privacy protection level. Here,
the message used to transmit via the network is 128 bit. It
can be observed in Fig 7 that the mean value of time cost
of message transmitting is only 17996 us (i.e. 17ms), when
there are 3 relaying nodes present. Even there are 10 relaying
nodes involved, the mean value of time cost is still below
60 us, which is more than acceptable. As shown in Fig 8,
the measurement from the identity disclosure protocol shows
a better performance. It only cost around 10 ms to perform,
when there are 3 relaying nodes. When there are 10 nodes
present, it cost around 35 ms on average.
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D. Throughput
We now evaluate the time cost for different size of packets.
Recall that in our previous experiment, the message used to
transmit via the network is 128 bit. We choose this because a
large packet may bring burden to the storage of Blockchain.
Data expansion is still an open question that has not been well
addressed for Blockchain applications. Even so, 128 bit may
not be enough in exceptional circumstances, especially when
files are involved. Therefore, we will explore the potential of
Onionchian in terms of throughput. Fig 9 and Fig 10 show the
results. It can be observed that even though the packets have
grown to 10 Mbit, the overheads are still fairly small. The
time costs have only increased less than 1 ms, in the cases of
message transmitting and identity disclosure. We infer that this
is because of the optimization of the run-time environment.
For example, the function for encryption may remain active
and ready for a long while, as long as it has been loaded into
memories.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we will review the research efforts that are
related to ours. We will review research efforts on Blockchain
Message size (byte)
Fig. 8. Time cost for different size of packets in message transmitting
6.3 A erag Time Cost
We conduct experiments to evaluate Onionchain perfor-
mance in regard of average time cost. To this end, we run
the message transmitting protocol and identity disclosure
protocol for 30 times and measure the time cost on average.
Each time we use 3, 5, 10 relaying nodes respectively,
to explore the performance in different privacy protection
level. Here, the message used to transmit via the network
is 128 bit. It can be observed in Fig. 6 that the mean value
of time cost of message transmitting is only 17996 us (i.e.
17.996 ms), when there are 3 relaying nodes present. Even
there are 10 relaying nodes involved, the mean value of time
cost is still below 60 us, which is more than acceptable.
As shown in Fig. 7, the measurement from the identity
disclosure protocol shows a better performance. It only costs
around 10 ms to perform, when there are 3 relaying nodes.
When there are 10 nodes present, it costs around 35 ms on
average.
6.4 Throughput
We now evaluate the time cost for different size of
packets. Recall that in our previous experiment, the message
used to transmit via the network is 128 bit. We choose this
because a large packet may bring burden to the storage of
Blockchain. Data expansion is still an open question that
has not been well addressed for Blockchain applications.
Even so, 128 bit may not be enough in exceptional cir-
cumstances, especially when files are involved. Therefore,
we will explore the potential of Onionchian in terms of
throughput. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the results. It can be
observed that even though the packets have grown to 10
Mbit, the overheads are still fairly small. The time costs
have only increased less than 1 ms, in the cases of message
transmitting and identity disclosure. We infer that this is
because of the optimization of the run-time environment.
For example, the function for encryption may remain active
and ready for a long while, as long as it has been loaded
into the memory.
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in the term of privacy-preserving and traceability. We then
review a Blockchain-based vehicle communication system.
We first review the privacy-preserving solutions related to
Blockchain. In this regards, a lot of efforts have been made,
while they fail to address remain the traceability. For example,
Kosba et al. present HAWK [6], which stores the encrypted
transactions instead of plain-text ones to protect transactional
privacy. In addition, instead of present new solutions for
Blockchain privacy-preserving, there are a bulk of works that
use Block as building blocks to address the privacy-preserving
issues existing in a specific scenario. Zyskind et al. [26]
uses the Blockchain to manage personal data. In terms of
privacy, the traditional third party is replaced by decentralized
Blockchain system in their system, so that users will not have
any concerns about the leakage of their privacy. Dorri et al.
[27] discuss how to employ a Blockchain-based system to
offer access control while preserving privacy in the context
of Internet of Things. Ouaddah et al. [28] address a similar
problem in IoT context using Blockchain. An extension has
also been proposed by Dorri [29], which discuss a few open
questions for Internet-connected automotive in the regards of
security and privacy. Yue et al. [30] propose Healthcare Data
Gateway, which addresses the privacy issues in the intelligence
of healthcare systems. They use the Blockchain to manage and
share data securely without violating privacy. A similar issue
has also been addressed in Esposito’s work [31]. Aitzhan et al.
[32] provide a Blockchain-based solution in the area of Smart
grid. Multi-signatures and anonymous encrypted messaging
streams are involved in addressing transaction security in
decentralized smart grid systems. A proof-of-concept is also
implemented to validate their solution. Liang [33] propose a
decentralized provenance architecture using blockchain tech-
nology, providing tamper-proof records, and achieving privacy
of the provenance data in the cloud environment. However, as
discussed, these Blockchain-based solutions are not omnipo-
tent, since they may subject to powerful transaction analysis
attacks [5].
We now review the Blockchain-based solutions in the term
of traceability. Tian [34] propose a Blockchain-based system
to offer traceability for food supply chain, guarantee the food
safety effectively. Another paper from him [35] demonstrate
how the same idea can work in the food supply chain with
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points). Simi-
larly, Lu et al. [36], Kamath [37] and Galvez et al. [38] discuss
how to trace the origin of products/food using Blockchain.
In addition to the food supply chain, other applications are
proposed based on the traceability of Blockchain. For example,
Di [39] et al. use the Traceability of Blockchain to observe
inter-organizational business processes. The work that is most
closely related to ours is the CreditCoin [40] by Li et al.
In their work, their goal is to provide a privacy-preserving
Blockchain-Based incentive mechanism. They also discuss the
traceability in their work. Our work is different from theirs,
because (i) their main concern is the incentive mechanism
rather than traceability. (ii) they involve the Trace manager
to trace malicious nodes. A trace manager is a group of
decentralized parties other than regular users. In our paper,
we do not make such an assumption. That is, every party can
be the one who traces the transactions back. Therefore, our
design is more realistic and decentralized. (iii) The generality
of their design is not well discussed, while our work can adapt
to many applications with little hindrance.
We now review the vehicle communication systems that
use Blockchain as their core engine. Sean Rowan et al. [41]
present a light inter-vehicle session key establishment protocol
using Blockchain technology, which establishes a trustworthy
relationship between vehicles and manufacturers. Madhusudan
Singh et al. [42] propose an Intelligent Vehicle-Trust Point(IV-
TP) mechanism using Blockchain technology, which provides
security and reliability for vehicles behavior. Blockchain pro-
vides verifiable technical support for their solution. Similarly,
Sharma et al. [3] build a transport system based on Blockchain,
allowing vehicles to achieve secure Resources access. Jamin
et al. [43] deploy Blockchain technology in the context of a
vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET), providing decentralized
VANET services, including vehicle insurance, updates on
traffic jams and weather forecasts. It can be observed that most
of the efforts introduce Blockchain to solve a specific issue in
the current vehicles communication systems. Different from
their works, our onionchain uses the vehicles communication
systems to demonstrate our generality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fact that Blockchain technology fails to provide
traceability and privacy-preserving simultaneously hinders
Blockchain from developing and expanding its applications.
To counter the issue, we propose Onionchain, offering appli-
cations a balanced option. Specifically, Onionchain integrates
the mechanism of Onion routing into our protocol, enabling
parties to perform transactions in an anonymous way. Besides,
Onionchain records intermediate variables generated during
the transactions, termed evidence, so that decentralized parties
can trace a malicious party back when dishonest behaviors
occur. An Onionchain-based vehicles communication system
is demonstrated to provide community guidelines to follow,
showing the generality of our design. Extensive experiments
are also performed to validate our Onionchain. The next stage
of our work falls into two aspects : (i) we may extend our
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7 RELATED WORK
In this section, we will review the research efforts that
are related to ours. In addition to what we have reviewed
in the introduction, We will review more research efforts
on Blockchain in the term of privacy and traceability. After-
wards, we then review Blockchain-based vehicles commu-
nication systems.
We first review the privacy-preserving solutions related
to Blockchain. In this regards, a lot of efforts have been
made, while they fail to address remain the traceability. For
example, Kosba et al. present HAWK [8], which stores the
encrypted transactions instead of plain-text ones to protect
transactional privacy. In addition, instead of presenting new
solutions for privacy, there are a bulk of works that use
Block as building blocks to address the privacy-preserving
issues existing in a specific scenario. Zyskind et al. [37]
use the Blockchain to manage personal data. In terms of
privacy, the traditional third party is replaced by decentral-
ized Blockchain system in their system, so that users will
not have any concerns about the leakage of their privacy.
Dorri et al. [38] discuss how to employ a Blockchain-based
system to offer access control while preserving privacy
in the context of Internet of Things. Ouaddah et al. [39]
address a similar problem in IoT context using Blockchain.
An extension has also been proposed by Dorri [40], which
discusses a few open questions for Internet-connected au-
tomotive in the regards of security and privacy. Yue et al.
[41] propose Healthcare Data Gateway, which addresses
the privacy issues in the intelligence of healthcare systems.
They use the Blockchain to manage and share data securely
without violating privacy. A similar issue has also been
addressed in Esposito’s work [42]. Aitzhan et al. [43] provide
a Blockchain-based solution in the area of smart grid. Multi-
signatures and anonymous encrypted messaging streams
are involved in addressing transaction security in decen-
tralized smart grid systems. A proof-of-concept is also im-
plemented to validate their solution. Liang [44] propose
a decentralized provenance architecture using blockchain
technology, providing tamper-proof records, and achieving
privacy of the provenance data in the cloud environment.
However, as discussed, these Blockchain-based solutions
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are not omnipotent, since they may subject to powerful
transaction analysis attacks [7].
We now review the Blockchain-based solutions in the
term of traceability. Tian [45] propose a Blockchain-based
system to offer traceability for food supply chain, guarantee
the food safety effectively. Another paper from him [46]
demonstrate how the same idea can work in the food supply
chain with HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points). Similarly, Lu et al. [47], Kamath [48] and Galvez et
al. [49] discuss how to trace the origin of products/food
using Blockchain. In addition to the food supply chain,
other applications are proposed based on the traceability
of Blockchain. For example, Di [50] et al. use the Traceabil-
ity of Blockchain to observe inter-organizational business
processes. The work that is most closely related to ours
is the CreditCoin [51] by Li et al. In their work, their
goal is to provide a privacy-preserving Blockchain-Based
incentive mechanism. They also discuss the traceability in
their work. Our work is different from theirs. The reasons
are (i) Their main concern is the incentive mechanism rather
than traceability; (ii) They involve the Trace manager to trace
malicious nodes. A trace manager is a group of decentral-
ized parties other than regular users. In our paper, we do not
make such an assumption. That is, every party can be the
one who traces the transactions back. Therefore, our design
is more realistic and decentralized; (iii) The generality of
their design is not well discussed, while our work can adapt
to many applications with little hindrance.
We now review the vehicle communication systems that
use Blockchain as their core engine. Sean Rowan et al. [52]
present a light inter-vehicle session key establishment proto-
col using Blockchain technology, which establishes a trust-
worthy relationship between vehicles and manufacturers.
Madhusudan Singh et al. [53] propose an Intelligent Vehicle-
Trust Point(IV-TP) mechanism using Blockchain technology,
which provides security and reliability for vehicles behav-
ior. Blockchain provides verifiable technical support for
their solution. Similarly, Sharma et al. [4] build a transport
system based on Blockchain, allowing vehicles to achieve
secure Resources access. Jamin et al. [54] deploy Blockchain
technology in the context of a vehicular ad-hoc network
(VANET), providing decentralized VANET services, includ-
ing vehicle insurance, updates on traffic jams and weather
forecasts. It can be observed that most of the efforts intro-
duce Blockchain to solve a specific issue in the current ve-
hicles communication systems. Different from their works,
our onionchain uses the vehicles communication systems to
demonstrate our generality.
8 CONCLUSION
The fact that Blockchain technology fails to provide
traceability and privacy-preserving simultaneously hinders
Blockchain from developing and expanding its applications.
To counter the issue, we propose Onionchain, offering ap-
plications a balanced option. Specifically, Onionchain inte-
grates the mechanism of Onion routing into our protocol,
enabling parties to perform transactions in an anonymous
way. Besides, Onionchain records intermediate variables
generated during the transactions, termed evidence, so that
decentralized parties can trace a malicious party back when
dishonest behaviors occur. An Onionchain-based Vehicular
Ad Hoc Networks is demonstrated to provide community
guidelines to follow, showing the generality of our design.
Extensive experiments are also performed to validate our
Onionchain.
We admit the current design also has limitations. For
example, we do not take the scalability of blockchain into
consideration [55]. That is, our design also suffers from
the transaction data explosion. To such a concern, we ar-
gue that (i) scalability of Blockchain is an open problem,
which is out of our focus. (ii) The solutions to this issue
have been widely discussed in previous works, such as
[56], [57]. Our approach does not retrofit the ecosystem of
Blockchain. Therefore, these approaches can be integrated
into our design with little efforts. (iii) For many Blockchain
applications such as VANET, the Blockchain is deployed
in RSUs or other Infrastructures, which have enough disk
spaces. An infrastructure like RSU will have no concerns
on the scalability of Blockchain. Finally, the next stage of
our work falls into three aspects : (i) we may extend our
work by exploring more scenarios. That is, more Onionchain
based system will appear. (ii) We may integrate solutions
that address the scalability to refine our system. (iii) we may
make our prototype public access, so that community can
benefit from it in a timely manner.
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